n 1865 Charles Dickens narrowly escaped death when the train on which he was traveling from Folkestone to London jumped a gap in the line occasioned by some repair work on a viaduct near Staplehurst, Kent. The foreman on the job miscalculated the time of the train's arrival; the flagman was only 550 yards from the works and unable to give adequate warning of the train's approach. The central and rear carriages fell off the bridge, plunging onto the river-bed below. Only one of the first class carriages escaped that plunge, coupled fast to the second class carriage in front. "It had come off the rail and was [. . .] hanging over the bridge at an angle, so that all three of them were tilted down into a corner" (Ackroyd 1013). Dickens managed to get Ellen Ternan and her mother, with whom he was traveling, out of the carriage and then behaved with remarkable self-possession, climbing down into the ravine and ministering to the many who lay injured and dying. With further aplomb, he climbed back into the dangerously unstable carriage and retrieved his manuscript, an account of which is offered in the memorable postscript to Our Mutual Friend (1865).
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He was greatly shaken and lost his voice for nearly two weeks: "I most unaccountably brought someone else's out of that terrible scene," he said. He suffered repeatedly from what he called "the shake," and, when he later traveled by train, he was in the grip of a persistent illusion that the carriage was down on the left side. Even a year later, he noted that he had sudden vague rushes of terror, which were "perfectly unreasonable but unsurmountable." At such times, his son and daughter reported, he was unaware of the presence of others and seemed to be in a kind of trance. His son Henry recalled that he got into a state of panic at the slightest jolt; Mamie attested that her father's nerves were I never really the same again: he "would fall into a paroxysm of fear, tremble all over and clutch the arms of the railway carriage." An uncanny repetition also characterizes his death, falling as it did on the anniversary of the accident five years later. 2 It is well known that Dickens was engaged throughout his literary career in representations of the railroad and used it to various effects, often combining the "humorous and the horrific" (Atthill 134) . 3 It would be unwise to claim, therefore, that the accident must have provoked his short story about railway disaster, "The Signalman" (1866), which appeared a year later as part of "Mugby Junction," the special Christmas issue of All the Year Round. Yet there is, I want to argue, an integral connection between Dickens's experience of accident trauma and this ghost story. While the fact of Dickens's own experience of the train crash has sometimes been acknowledged in discussions of "The Signalman," it is usually by way of a closing gesture to the grim and eerie irony that he died on the same day as the accident. To read "The Signalman" through the lens of current trauma theory, however, is to see that Dickens's story uncannily apprehends the heart of traumatic experience in its focus on the uncoupling of event and cognition, on belatedness, repetitive and intrusive return, and on a sense of powerlessness at impending disaster. The question that this reading of the story then raises is whether there was a discourse of trauma in the 1860s which could have provided Dickens with a hermeneutic through which to respond to his experience. That question draws us to consider both the pre-Freudian history of trauma and the relation between literature and the psychological and medical discourse of its day.
Trauma has in recent years commanded great interest across a range of disciplines. As trauma theory continues "perking" in literary studies, critics are beginning to think about why trauma should now be claiming such attention (Hartman 537) . In a century that has seen cataclysmic and catastrophic activities of many kinds, a concern with aftermath-events and their representation and reconstruction-should come as no surprise. Although no one could claim that the twentieth century has the monopoly on horrific experience, trauma theory, it has been suggested, rose as a response to "modern" experiences such as shell shock. The writings of Freud and the beginnings of psychoanalysis are often the starting point for trauma theorists who see the interest in and awareness of trauma as part of modernity itself. But the material conditions and technologies we associate with modernity began well before the twentieth century. What of earlier conceptions of psychic trauma? How did Victorians think about experiences of near death, of miraculous survival? How did they understand the effect on consciousness and memory of events and experiences that "went beyond the range of the normal"-events so overwhelming and unassimilable that the ordinary processes of registration and representation were suspended or superseded?
In order to historicize the trauma theory of the twentieth century, it is useful to look at the earlier coincidence of trauma theory and the conditions of modernity manifested in industrial technologies of the Victorian period. As Freud himself remarked in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) , there is "a condition [which] has long been known and described [and] which occurs after severe mechanical concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a risk to life; it has been given the name of traumatic neurosis" (12, my emphasis). 4 During the nineteenth century the technology of the railway not only revolutionized travel and conceptions of time and space but gave rise to largescale, disastrous accidents. The damage to life and limb resulting from such accidents provoked claims against the railroad companies, and these in turn produced the need for insurance companies. Insurance companies were reluctant to pay damages for anything except demonstrable physical injury consequent on the accident. Medical practitioners called upon to verify injury found their attention focused on hitherto unexamined forms of suffering. As a result, the question of injurious effects not consequent on gross mechanical injury but apparently the result of the shock of the accident became a vexed and contentious one in mid-Victorian medicine. Exploring the effects of modernity in the form of railway travel, its disasters, and the statistical risks associated with indemnification and insurance, we encounter an emerging discourse of "psychic shock" that stands behind the development of trauma theory.
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Occupied as it is with trains and railway disaster, this essay follows a number of different tracks. First I map the development of a discourse about trauma or "psychic shock" in the 1860s. I am not arguing that before technological accidents there was no trauma, but rather that trauma came to be viewed as a medical condition worthy of notice and study as a result of modern technology and its effects. (This position does not preclude the possibility that the technology was indeed responsible for an increased incidence of trauma.) Freud was interested in what happened to the traumatized patient's memorywhether shocking events were processed and available to recall in the same way as other experiences. The focus on memory and flashback enabled Freud to remark on the peculiar bypassing of conscious memory that characterizes response to trauma. In contrast, the Victorian discourse of nervous shock focused mainly on the effects on the nervous system; the effect of shock on memory is not something that particularly occupies Victorian doctors probing the psychic damage of railway accidents. Why did the Victorians not turn their attention to the connection between trauma and memory dysfunction? What conceptions of memory and particularly "unconscious" memory were prevalent in the mid-Victorian period? In order to probe these questions, I then switch tracks to examine those psychological domains where the Victorians did study memory. Of particular relevance here are Victorian constructions of memory under extraordinary but not necessarily traumatic conditions-altered states, such as somnambulism, trance, mesmerism, hypnotism.
6 Under what circumstances is memory lost or retrieved? How is it that knowledge unavailable to the conscious mind can emerge in unusual situations? How, in sum, did Victorians formulate the relationship between conscious memory and what Christopher Bollas has aptly called "the unthought known"? These two tracks connect Victorian psychology (in hindsight) to the discourse of trauma from Freud on to the late-twentieth-century theorizings of Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, and others, which is increasingly focused on memory and its dysfunctions, on belatedness, repetition, flashback, and hallucination. The last section of this essay will turn to Dickens's story "The Signalman" to uncover a subterranean route or switch whereby these two apparently distinct tracks come together (and thus are more nearly resonant with current trauma studies). I will suggest that "The Signalman" is a kind of literary missing link between the Victorian discourse of nervous shock and Victorian conceptions of unconscious memory. The discursive development of trauma studies in the mid-1860s may have provided Dickens with a hermeneutic through which he could respond to his own experience, but, more significantly, his sensitivity to altered states and the literary possibilities of the ghost story-a favored genre-helped him to articulate what the nascent study of trauma at this time was not quite yet poised to formulate.
Mid-Victorian Concepts of Psychic Shock
In or around the mid-1860s, the concept of psychic trauma began to percolate in Victorian Britain. And what brought it to consciousness was, arguably, the railway. 7 To place the railway more squarely within the history of trauma, we may say that the railway accident was to Victorian psychology what World War I and shell shock were to Freudian. The railway accident was the exemplary instance for Victorian medical discourse that propelled the prevailing pathological bias in relation to injury in the direction of a psychic interpretation of injury.
Industrialization and the rise of the insurance company were the twin economic factors in the development of medical interest in this subject. As Henri Ellenberger notes in his magisterial history of the discovery of the unconscious, "the development of industry and the multiplication of industrial accidents on the one side, and the development of insurance companies on the other," meant that "more and more 'official medicine' was on the search for new theories and new therapeutic methods for these neuroses" (245). Similarly, Wolfgang Schivelbusch's 1978 study of the railway journey, which lays the tracks for all future studies in this line, points out that in England by 1864 railroad companies had become legally liable for their passengers' safety and health (134); since only "pathologically demonstrable damage" qualified victims for compensation, those victims who suffered damages without a demonstrable cause created "a legal and medical problem whose solution in the courts depended on the medical profession" (134-35).
In the 1860s the "phenomenon of accident shock," the traumatization of a victim without discernible physical injury, became the object of systematic investigation by the medical profession.
8 Thomas Buzzard, for example, a doctor whose series of articles appeared in the Lancet in 1867, was very interested in cases where external injuries were negligible but effects on the nervous system were severe. In one case, he noted, the shock changed the very national constitution of an individual, who transformed from "the most thorough Englishman in all his habits to the manner of the most coxcombical Frenchman" (I: 624). Herbert Page, whose work of the 1880s and 90s is influential, is interested primarily in fright or shock, but he pays attention largely to its effects on the nervous system-hysterical fits, spasms, vomiting, pulse rate, and so on. And though he notes the effect of shock on memory, it is merely to say that it affects energy and concentration rather than the recall of events and inci-dents of past life (Railway Injuries 44). But he does record that patients suffering from traumatic hysteria sometimes have a "great dread of impending evil" (Injuries of the Spine 153). They usually sleep badly and are constantly troubled by distressing dreams: "Depend upon it that the man who can sleep naturally and well after a railway collision has not met with any serious shock to his nervous system" (158). He notes too the element of delay or belatedness which will become so important in the Freudian conceptualization of trauma: "Warded off in the first place by the excitement of the scene, the shock is gathering, in the very delay itself, new force from the fact that the sources of alarm are continuous, and for the time all prevalent in the patient's mind" (148). The emphasis on a "continuous" and "prevalent" source of alarm suggests the possession of the patient by the shocking event. William James explained delay by means of the following example in his 1894 review of Pierre Janet's work:
The fixed ideas may slumber until some weakening of the nervous system favors their morbid activity. E.g., Col. is victim of a railroad accident, and passes six months Even this very brief history serves to contextualize and explain Freud's references in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to "a condition [which] has long been known and described" (12). Having acknowledged the lengthy history of traumatic neurosis, Freud then proceeds to offer the recent war as the defining moment for diagnosis of psychic shock. On the one hand, Freud indicates a familiarity with the phenomenon of railway trauma; on the other, he seems not to acknowledge the medical studies that had already, for some decades, focused on the absence of gross mechanical force:
The terrible war which has just ended gave rise to a great number of illnesses of this kind, but it at least put an end to the temptation to attribute the cause of the disorder to organic lesions of the nervous system brought about by mechanical force. [. . .] In the case of the war neuroses the fact that the same symptoms sometimes came about without the intervention of any gross mechanical force seemed at once enlightening and bewildering. (12) Freud's study of the dreams of shell-shocked soldiers of the 1914-1918 war provided him with an important insight into the nature of dreams. He noticed that the dreams of the traumatized were markedly different from those of ordinary dreamers in that they woke the patient up "in another fright" (13); they returned him to the scene of horror, reproducing it repeatedly and literally, whereas ordinary dream work consisted of creating scenarios to express fears and desires. Dreaming allowed ordinary patients to release anxieties and so keep sleeping; traumatic dreams woke the patient, and were therefore unable to appease anxiety. This insight in relation to traumatized soldiers allowed Freud to theorize what he had remarked in a less obvious way in his earlier work on traumatic neurosis. The hallmark of trauma, Freud decided, was the inability to possess memory, to make the event the subject of narrative. The memory seemed to possess the sufferer rather than the other way around. Hence Caruth's rearticulation of Freud: "to be traumatized is to be possessed by an image or event" (Trauma 5). It has been suggested that trauma involves the collapse of witnessing and understanding, in that the event can only be witnessed at the cost of recognizing oneself as a witness. "Central to the very immediacy of this experience, that is, is a gap that carries the force of the event and does so precisely at the expense of simple knowledge and memory. The force of this experience would appear to arise precisely [. . .] in the collapse of understanding" (Caruth, Trauma 7). Trauma, then, comes to be theorized as the experience in which knowledge and cognition are disjoined. Geoffrey Hartman describes this as the missed encounter, the event "registered rather than experienced" in that "the traumatic event bypasses perception and consciousness, and falls directly into the psyche" (537). The knowledge that the traumatized subject stores is inaccessible to ordinary memory, but signals its presence in the form of intrusive return. It is as if the encounter, having been missed, demands recognition through reenactment rather than recall.
Memory, "Unconscious Cerebration" and the "Unthought Known"
If any one faculty of our nature may be called more wonderful than the rest, I do think it is memory. There seems something more speakingly incomprehensible in the powers, the failures, the inequalities of memory, than in any other of our intelligences. The memory is sometimes so retentive, so serviceable, so obedient-at others, so bewildered and so weak-and at others again, so tyrannic, so beyond controul! We are to be sure a miracle every way-but our powers of recollecting and of forgetting do seem peculiarly past finding out.
-Jane Austen, Mansfield Park (188) Fanny Price's awareness of the vagaries of memory serves to indicate what, by the mid-nineteenth century, had become the focus of much scrutiny-those aspects of memory that seemed "peculiarly past finding out": our powers of "recollecting and forgetting," and the operations of unconscious memory. From the first, Freud's work, unlike that of his Victorian predecessors, emphasized the effects of shock on memory. In the review mentioned earlier, James writes also of the studies of two "distinguished Viennese neurologists" for whom hysteria "starts always with a shock, and is a 'disease of the memory'" (199). Although Victorian medical treatises on railway shock and injury move toward a focus on psychic rather than mechanical injury, very little attention is paid to the effect on memory of traumatic shock. Physiologists and psychologists writing about memory are also little interested in the effect of shock, though physical blows to the head prove perennially engaging (see Carpenter, for example, . In his 1860 treatise, On Obscure Diseases of the Brain, and Disorders of the Mind, Forbes Winslow does give some examples of the disruptions in memory after shock, but these are in effect a cabinet of curiosities drawn from cases reported in the previous century rather than a thoroughgoing investigation of what makes one remember or forget in response to extraordinary stimulus. One case, for example, concerns a "lady of rank" who experienced a severe shock consequent upon the receipt of the melancholy intelligence of the sudden death of an only and much-beloved child. She continued for several days in a stunned and apparently dying state. She, however, recovered. For many months afterwards her memory exhibited a singular defect. She appeared to have no recollection of the cause of her illness, and of the severe loss she had sustained. When she was informed of the death of her son, for the period of a minute she appeared to realize the melancholy fact; but the impression almost instantly passed away. About nine months from this time she was found dead in her bed. Disease of the heart and brain was said to have been discovered after death.
(407. For further cases, see In Diseases of Memory (1881, trans. 1882), Theodule Ribot, well known for his work in France on physiological psychology, cites cases in which memory becomes more intense in abnormal states and undergoes permanent improvement after illness and shock:
A man with a "remarkably clear head," [. . .] was crossing a railway in the country when an express train at full speed appeared closely approaching him. He had just time to throw himself down in the center of the road between the two lines of rails, SPRING 2001 and as the vast train passed over him, the sentiment of impending danger to his very existence brought vividly into his recollection every incident of his former life in such an array as that which is suggested by the promised opening of "the great book at the last great day." Even allowing for exaggeration, these instances show a superintensity of action on the part of the memory of which we can have no idea in its normal state. (176) Ribot rehearses here the widely credited idea that all memory is stored and recoverable. One of the most dramatic and frequently cited instances of this notion is Coleridge's widely quoted account in Biographia Literaria (1817) of a young woman in Germany who could neither read nor write, but as a result of a fever began to speak in Latin, Hebrew, and Greek. It was discovered that, as a child, the woman had been looked after by a pastor who had knowledge of these languages and used to recite passages from the Latin and Greek fathers, and Rabbinical texts . What is critical in the passage from Ribot cited above is the assumption that the "normal state" of memory is merely a less intense version of the "superintensity" occasioned by an extreme situation. The "normal state" of memory is a happy relationship of storage and retrieval, an archive under good management. If memory was thought of as a storehouse of previous thoughts, a kleptomaniac's secret hoard, an engraving or even photograph, the assumption that unusual conditions could suddenly assist in bringing to light the further reaches of such stores is understandable in its appeal. Noting that others have already commented on the remarkable and permanent development of memory after shocks, attacks of smallpox, and other diseases, Ribot concludes that "the mechanism of this metamorphosis being inscrutable, there is no reason why we should dwell on it here" (178). The case histories recited by Winslow and Ribot suggest that the erasure and recovery of memory are equally mysterious processes. Why the one occurs as opposed to the other is as inscrutable as the "mechanism of metamorphosis" itself. What seems undisputed, however, is the miraculous latency of memory.
In Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), William Benjamin Carpenter, probably the most authoritative voice on memory in midVictorian medicine, sets out the prevailing view of the latency or dormancy of all memory:
It is now very generally accepted by Psychologists as (to say the least) a predictable doctrine, that any Idea which has once passed through the Mind may be thus reproduced, at however long an interval, through the instrumentality of suggestive action; the recurrence of any other state of consciousness with which that idea was originally linked by Association, being adequate to awaken it also from its dormant or "latent" condition, and to bring it within the "sphere of consciousness." (429) Drawing on the image of the railway, which frequently crops up as an apt structuring metaphor in explanations of the relation between conscious and unconscious thinking, Carpenter continues:
And as our ideas are thus linked in "trains" or "series" which further inosculate with each other like the branch lines of a railway or the ramifications of an artery, so, it is considered, an idea which has been "hidden in the obscure recesses of the mind" for years-perhaps for a lifetime,-and which seems to have completely faded out of the conscious Memory [. . .] may be reproduced as by the touching of a spring, through a nexus of suggestion, which we can sometimes trace-out continuously, but of which it does not seem necessary that all the intermediate steps should fall within our cognizance. Similarly, E. S. Dallas's The Gay Science (1866) draws on the idea of traffic between related spheres. The railway being such a visible aspect of modernity in Victorian life, it is not surprising that railway tracks, networks, trains of thought, and lines of communication should come to the aid of those explaining the activity of invisible modes of thought, and, indeed, influence the very way in which the mind's operations could be visualized. A study of psychology and aesthetics, Dallas's text includes a discussion of imagination-the unconscious, or the hidden soul-in its evaluation of current theories of memory. "Between the outer and the inner ring, between our unconscious and our conscious existence, there is a free and a constant but unobserved traffic forever carried on. Trains of thought are continually passing to and fro, from the light into the dark, and back from the dark into the light" (I: 207). One might phrase the matter more succinctly, as Dickens has Mr. Toodle in Dombey and Son (1848) sagely remark, "What a Junction a man's thoughts is [. . .] to be sure!" (449).
The idea of memory as a treasure house of stored and recuperable knowledge was notably challenged in the early 1860s by Frances Power Cobbe's emphasis on the fallacies of memory. What we remember, she argued in opposition to the idea of the permanent register, the engraved tablet, are layered reconstructions of memories, where each "fresh trace varies a little from the trace beneath, sometimes magnifying and beautifying it, through the natural bias of the soul to grandeur and beauty, sometimes distorting it through passion or prejudice; in all and every case the original mark is ere long essentially changed" (151). What Cobbe describes here is akin to that which trauma theorists such as Judith Herman (following Janet) would describe as normal, narrative memory. Narrative memory is simply memory that is available to recall and retelling. It can be made the subject of narrative. It is possessed by the subject who remembers and is inevitably shaped by distortions and biases in the process of narrativization. In contrast, traumatic memory is that which lies inaccessible and unpossessed. It is not at the disposal of the subject, but rather able itself to possess the unremembering subject by obtruding on the present in the form of dreams, flashbacks, and hallucinations. It was after all the very literalness of the traumatic memory or dream that alerted Freud to the fact that the process of registering traumatic events and experiences was out of the ordinary. On that basis, we might argue that what made it possible for Freud to recognize traumatic memory was the very normalization of distortion, or what Cobbe calls fallacy. But here, too, as we shall see in Carpenter's work on memory, the Victorians come close to anticipating Freud. Acknowledging Cobbe's views on the fallacies of memory, Carpenter also challenges the doctrine of memory's indelibility, suggesting that it has been too generally applied; it is "questionable whether everything that passes through our Minds thus leaves its impression on that material instrument" (454). Carpenter suggests that we sometimes visualize so strongly that we realise [. . .] forgotten experiences, by repeatedly picturing them to ourselves, that the ideas of them attain a force and vividness which equals or even exceeds that which the actual memory of them would afford. In like manner, when the Imagination has been exercised in a sustained and determinate manner,-as in the composition of a work of fiction,-its ideal creations may be reproduced with the force of actual experiences; and the sense of personal identity may be projected backwards (so to speak) into the characters which the Author has "evolved out of the depths of his own consciousness,"-as Dickens states to have been continually the case with himself. (455) The process Carpenter outlines is the exercise of the imagination in creating something apparently fictitious that then assumes a life of its own and, in becoming that with which the author identifies, is able to show him what was hidden or covert within him. The author both creates himself and reveals himself through his characters, an intense form of the process detectable in all memory "creation." And not unexpectedly, Dickens provides an example in Carpenter's explanations, coming to mind as the author most readily associated with imaginative intensity and creative memory.
Even though the tenor of this passage is to question the extent of the "doctrine of indelibility," Carpenter does specify that certain categories of experience are indelible. One of these is especially pertinent to Freudian views about trauma: "Single experiences of peculiar force and vividness, such as are likely to have left very decided traces, although the circumstances of their formation were so unusual as to keep them out of ordinary Associational remembrance" (454). Carpenter refers by way of example to a case (cited in the 1830s by John Abercrombie) involving a fifteen-year-old boy who, while suffering from delirium, recalled aspects of surgery he had undergone at the age of four. He was able to remember scenes he could only have "witnessed" while unconscious and very young. Carpenter's "single experience of peculiar force" indelible and yet unavailable to ordinary associative memory is not unrelated to Freud's traumatic event, the experience of which is unremembered yet belatedly, intrusively, and literally asserted. The point of Carpenter's example is that the boy was not "there" in consciousness and hence one would not have expected him to be able to remember details of the operation; in the case of trauma, the subject is apparently "there" and conscious-so it was expected that physically unscathed victims of railway accidents be able to recall their experiences.
The conundrum of presence and absence of mind was nowhere more intriguing than in states of altered consciousness. The complex history of controversy surrounding concepts such as mesmerism, hypnotism or Braidism, spiritualism, and somnambulism attests to the nineteenth-century fascination with altered states of mind, and with the relation between conscious and (as Carpenter called it) "unconscious cerebration." In part, this fascination with altered states raised the question of what it meant to be human and conscious. What kinds of activity were performed without conscious and voluntary supervision? What force was controlling mental function in states of mind that were not fully conscious? John Abercrombie had in previous decades written about the states of mind distinguished by ideas and images over which we have no conscious control: dreams, somnambulism and double consciousness, insanity and spectral illusion . 9 The century saw an array of explanations of brain function and physiology, ranging from small concessions to the reflex function of the brain, on the one hand, to theories of the brain as two separate, rigidly divided hemispheres on the other, an idea (put forward in the 1840s by Arthur Wigan) that offered a striking model for mental dissociation (see Winter; Taylor, "Obscure Recesses" 150) .
No discussion of Victorian altered states can proceed far without taking account of mesmerism, a powerful if controversial influence in England from the 1830s to 60s. Proponents of mesmerism claimed a great deal on its behalf: as a manifestation of the mind's power it was evidence of the mesmerizer's capacity to transmit his thoughts to the mesmerized subject, and, in the form of "mental travelling" or clairvoyance, was able to surmount obstacles of time and space.
10 Like other new technologies-steam and electricity-which were also revolutionizing experiences of time and space, mesmerism was a technology of the mind, hailed by its adherents in England as progressive and far-reaching. Alison Winter rightly observes that "this generation, surrounded by astonishing changes wrought by science, set few limits on the powers that might be revealed in electricity, light, magnetism, and gases. [. . .] The claim that an imponderable fluid could pass from one individual to another, altering the processes of thought, was astonishing, but just as worthy of serious evaluation as other great scientific assertions" (35). Victorian theories of mesmerism tell us much about the way Victorians construed the unconscious. In his astute assessment of mesmerism and hypnosis Jonathan Miller explains the stakes in terms of the nature and extent of the territory between the "unarguably automatic and the self-evidently voluntary" (18). What was the role of the unconscious, as mid-Victorians such as Carpenter understood it, in the behavioral and cognitive capacities of human beings? Hypnotic trance was important to Carpenter and others because, as the former explained, it was in those states (like hypnosis) where the directing power of the will is suspended, that action is determined by some dominant idea which has temporarily full possession of the mind (see Miller 27) . Hypnotic trance confirmed the existence among human beings of an "'automatic self' of which they have no conscious knowledge and over which they have little voluntary control" (28). Differing from the "custodial" unconscious of Freudian theory, this mid-Victorian concept of unconscious cerebration, Miller suggests, can best be described as enabling: "If consciousness is to implement the psychological tasks for which it is best fitted, it is expedient to assign a large proportion of psychic activity to automatic control: if the situation calls for a high-level managerial decision, the Unconscious will freely deliver the necessary information to awareness" (29). Miller's emphasis on delivery accords with the transportation and railroad metaphors used by Dallas to express the relations between conscious and unconscious activity. Rather than censorship and an edict against knowing, the situation was simply one of efficient delegation and storage. When Miller considers the question of accessibility, it is to contrast the "detention" in which the Freudian unconscious holds its mental contents with the free delivery that characterizes mid-nineteenth-century concepts of the unconscious.
The question of accessibility in the context of traumatic memory is somewhat different, however. When he came to consider traumatic experience, as we have seen, Freud posited a category of experience that was inaccessible in a different way than the repressions of the unconscious. Whereas ordinary dreams were the royal road to the unconscious, the dreams and hallucinations of traumatized patients were too literal and self-referential to lead anywhere but back to the traumatic event itself. They were a reliving rather than a representation of the event, a snapshot rather than a symbology. Caruth argues therefore that trauma can be seen as a symptom of history rather than a symptom of the unconscious. Miller's distinction between Freudian and Victorian ideas of the unconscious becomes less illuminating when we reach the question of trauma. In trauma, it is not relevant whether the unconscious is characterized as censorious, on the one hand, or enabling, on the other, because the nature and effect of the "unthought known" changes. The very nature of traumatic memory as something different from repression takes the question beyond that of voluntary and automatic selves, or unconsciously repressed selves. It is instead a question of the knowing and unknowing self-of how something can be experienced so that it is not available to ordinary consciousness but may be retrieved or reexperienced under the suspension of the will or in a trancelike state.
Dickens: Signaling Trauma
I turn now to Dickens, who is represented in Carpenter's work, as we saw earlier, as the writer intimately engaged with the imaginative reconstruction of the self through memory, and who also was fascinated by mesmerism over a long period and in a variety of ways. Not only was Dickens a close friend for many years of Dr. John Elliotson, the great pioneer of mesmerism in England, and witness to a large number of displays of animal magnetism, he was himself a practicing mesmerist. Fittingly, he took the role of the Doctor in Elizabeth Inchbald's eighteenth-century farce, Animal Magnetism (1788), a play that formed a double bill with The Frozen Deep (1857) and was performed in private theatricals (Winter 148) .
11 According to Fred Kaplan, Dickens, by the time he went on his Italian trip in 1844, was able to magnetize a range of subjects and was primed to develop an intense relationship with Augusta de la Rue, helping to relieve her "convulsions, distortions of the limbs, aching headaches, insomnia, and a plague of neurasthenic symptoms" through frequent mesmeric therapeutics (Kaplan 77) . He was in fact practicing a form of psychotherapy, and working on the assumption that her altered state revealed aspects of personality and psyche that were hidden from her ordinary consciousness. Dickens relied on techniques such as "sleep-waking" and mesmeric trance (77). Through questions to his mesmerized patient, he formulated theories of what was causing her ailments and attempted to battle the dominating phantoms that surfaced when she was in a state of altered consciousness. Though Dickens never abandoned his belief in an independent fluid as the physical basis of magnetism, it was clearly the relation between conscious and unconscious selves that fascinated him about the magnetized state. Dickens seemed to understand that the mesmerized state offered the prospect of finding out what it is we know, but do not know that we know. What later trauma theory would propose was that the traumatized subject, though not somnambulist or mesmerized, was in a state akin to these "altered states." Shock or fright could produce the effect of making memory inaccessible; trance, nightmare, or flashback could return the victim to the unprocessed and terrible knowledge of the traumatic event. Although such propositions were not part of the discourse of nervous shock at the time Dickens suffered his accident, they are nevertheless the stuff of "The Signalman." I want to suggest, then, that because Dickens was sympathetic to the possibility of unconscious knowledge, and because he was adept at manipulating the literary possibilities within the genre of the ghost story, in this story he is able to articulate more about the relation of trauma and memory than was available to him in the current discourse on nervous shock. In so doing, he powerfully anticipates the formulations of Freud and later trauma theory.
The genre of the ghost story and trauma narrative have much in common, since to be traumatized is arguably to be haunted, to be living a ghost story: it is "to be possessed by an image or event" (Caruth, Trauma 5) . It may then seem tautological to say that Dickens's story of uncanny possession is a story of trauma. But even though Dickens's ghost stories frequently objectify states of mind, not all ghost stories are expressive primarily of trauma-A Christmas Carol (1843), for example, is a notable exception. In ghost stories, as in trauma, the sanctity of ordered time is violated as the past intrudes on the present. In its depiction of both the signalman's distress and the narrator's responses, this story dwells on powerlessness, heightened vigilance and a sense of impending doom, uncanny reenactment, and terror at the relived intrusion. These are all legitimate aspects of a tale of horror; they are also all characteristics of trauma. Just as Augusta de la Rue's "phantoms" emerged in the mesmerized state, so in the ghost story Dickens could give play to the phantoms or specters that intruded as hallucinations to demand that the possessed subject revisit areas of experience not fully assimilated. The ghost story was a way of probing unusual psychological states. As Dickens wrote to Elizabeth Gaskell in 1851, ghost stories were illustrative of "particular states of mind and processes of the imagination" (qtd. in Schlicke 249). The possibilities in the ghost story allow Dickens in "The Signalman" to confront the disjunction in subjectivity that trauma occasions as he dramatizes the emphatic gap between knowledge and cognition, signing and meaning, the shocking external occurrence and its internal assimilation and representation. The story is Dickens's way of pondering that fateful and fatal gap in the tracks at Staplehurst, a creative way of articulating his personal experience of railway shock that seems, from the vantage point of the present, uncannily prescient of the direction and emphasis that trauma studies would take in the next century. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of trauma to which the story gives voice is the feeling of powerlessness in the survivor, who may not recall the traumatic event but has an overwhelming sense of impending and unavoidable doom. In the story, the narrator one evening passes a signalman's remote box, hails the signalman, and shows that he wishes to descend to the box and talk to him. The signalman tells the narrator of a "spectre" who has been haunting him. Indeed, he takes the narrator initially to be an apparition or ghost, the very same as the one that has appeared to him on the line near his signal box a number of times. On one occasion, the "spectre" appeared before a terrible collision; then again before the death of a young lady on the train. The signalman imagines that the apparition's reappearance precedes a further tragic event. That turns out to be the signalman's own death. 12 Dickens's story focuses obsessively on the signalman's anguish at receiving a warning in time, but finding it impossible to heed because he does not know about what exactly he is being warned.
With some justification the story could be read as a fantasy of revenge against signalmen, though in the Staplehurst disaster, strictly speaking, it was not the signalman who blundered. The foreman on the job miscalculated the time of the train's arrival; the flagman was too close to give adequate warning of the train's approach. In the story, the signalman is too close to the train and does not or cannot heed the warning as the engine bears down on him. Ironically, the signalman lives in a state of heightened vigilance, yet dies because he is unable to read the precise import of the warning; he is powerless to prevent his own death on the tracks. But there is also the sense that the signalman does not want to prevent his death. In this way, he may be seen as exemplifying the death drive that Freud associates with traumatic reenactment: he does not heed the whistle and literally allows death to overtake him as the train comes upon him from behind and cuts him down. On the one hand, Freud saw traumatic reenactment as the life-affirming attempt to master the stimulus retrospectively through repetition; on the other, he later came to see the daemonic content of reenactment as evidence of the death instinct.
13 If the signalman in some sense exemplifies the death instinct, the story as a whole may be seen as a traumatic reenactment: Dickens returns imaginatively to the site of the railway accident in order to master a stimulus that resists mastery.
Dickens's story also apprehends the repetitive cycle of trauma. Based structurally on the principle of repetition, "The Signalman" reveals the hallmark of trauma as unbidden repetition and return. In Dickens's story the trauma repeats and accumulates. Not only is the signalman compelled to witness a terrible train disaster, he is tantalized through the "spectre's" visitations by an impossible clairvoyance. The trauma compounds as the signalman is twice forewarned but is both times unable to avert death and disaster. After the first terrible accident on the line, the signalman thinks he has recovered from witnessing the carnage: "Six or seven months passed, and I had recovered from the surprise and shock" (531). At that point, the specter appears to him again and the next calamity occurs: "I heard terrible screams and cries.
A beautiful young lady had died instantaneously in one of the compartments and was brought in here, and laid down on this floor between us" (532). Now the specter has appeared again, signaling to him some further calamity about to occur on the line, and prompting, the signalman laments, "this cruel haunting of him" (533). Haunted not only by the past, but by a past that seems to project itself into the future, the signalman is subjected to relentless repetition and can avail himself of neither hindsight nor foresight.
As it is understood today, trauma is the inability to know the past as past-it is therefore a "disease of time" in which the events of the past continually obtrude on the present in the form of flashbacks and hallucinations (Young 7) . Traumatic memory is the return that does not recognize itself as a return. Like the train disaster that is literally a disruption of linearity, the narrative of "The Signalman" disrupts linear sequence. In part, this sense arises from the clairvoyant specter, whose gestures enact and predict each of three train disasters before they occur. The sense of disturbed linearity or chronology arises also from the fact that the narrator seems to be taking part in something that has already happened. That is, the narrative is itself part of some uncanny repetition. The fact that the narrator uses the words, "For God's sake, clear the way," themselves repeated many times in the course of the story, could suggest that the narrator has just repeated his part in the replay of a past he "knows" but does not know he knows.
In support of this line of thinking, the narrator from the outset seems inexplicably drawn to approach the signalman, all the odder because initially he says he is not someone given to starting up conversations.
14 Understandably the signalman imagines that the narrator is himself a further spectral illusion, especially since the narrator hails him with the exact words that the specter has already used. After a time the signalman seems reassured that the rational, skeptical narrator is not a ghost, and confides his story to him. By persistently dismissing as "imagination" what the signalman says he has seen, by construing recurrence as coincidence, by remaining stubbornly unbelieving, the narrator refuses to witness the signalman's hallucination or spectral illusion. He refuses, in effect, to witness the trauma. But it is arguably inscribed upon him nonetheless, and he is now (as narrator) participating in the repetition by telling the story of it. When the narrator arrives at the tracks for the third time, he is struck with a "nameless horror" because he sees the "appearance of a man" in the tunnel and clearly thinks he is seeing a ghost (535). The horror that oppresses him passes when he sees that the figure is a real man. Horror gives way to fear that something is wrong. He then learns of the signalman's death. All would appear to be resolved for the rational narrator, except for the fact that the words the engine driver called out were the very ones in the narrator's thoughts. Despite the matter-of-factness of the coda, it is clear that the narrator too will be haunted by the words, "For God's sake, clear the way."
It is this widening implication and involvement that warns the reader against focusing only on the signalman and seeing him as a pathological case. Graeme Tytler, for example, has diagnosed the signalman as suffering from monomania-a clinical condition in which the patient is obsessed by one dominating idea. A man with a one-track mind, the signalman is undeniably fixated. But he could equally well be diagnosed as suffering from Abercrombie's spectral illusion or Wigan's split self. John Stahl, meanwhile, has seen in the story a critique of industrialization in Dickens's representation of the alienated labor of the signalman and the stress his job entails. But rather than pathologizing the signalman as a "case of partial insanity" (421) or substituting an alternate diagnosis stemming from stress in the workplace, I want to emphasize how the narrator and reader are drawn into the ongoing trauma, and the way the entire narrative is shaped by and expressive of the logic of trauma.
If the specter can be seen as an articulation of the signalman's traumatized consciousness, the narrator shares characteristics of the signalman that suggest he is not just a detached interlocutor, auditor, or reporter. The signalman thinks initially that the narrator is a specter; the narrator has a "monstrous thought" that the signalman is a spirit. Each finds himself in a position that makes him feel compelled to act and assume responsibility for the general safety of those on the line. When the signalman sees the apparition for a third time, he is (literally) beside himself to interpret the warning and forestall the disaster. But he cannot. Similarly, the narrator feels himself compelled to act: "But what ran most in my thoughts was the consideration how ought I to act, having become the recipient of this disclosure" (534). The narrator is less worried about the uninterpretable spectral warnings than he is about the mental stability of the signalman and his job performance under present stress. He resolves to try to calm the signalman as much as possible and to return the next morning to visit with him the "wisest medical practitioner [. . .] and to take his opinion" (535). He is also too late. The specter appears to the signalman on three occasions; the narrator descends to the signalman's box three times; the words the narrator uses are the words that the ghost has used and the train driver will use; the gesture that the signalman describes is given words by the narrator but, significantly, he does not speak these words-"For God's sake, clear the way"-before the engine driver tells the narrator that those are in fact the words he used. The narrator, the signalman, the specter, and the engine driver are all bound together in a series of overlapping occurrences and repeated occurrences and expressions, in a history that seems to have begun before the narration begins and will continue after it ends.
Trauma vexes the boundaries between outside and inside; recent theorists have remarked that trauma is a situation in which the outside goes inside without mediation (see Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 59). In "The Signalman," Dickens expresses the internal dislocations associated with the external accident. Measuring the distance between Dickens's article "Need Railway Travellers be Smashed?" and his story "The Signalman" we see-genre and overt intention notwithstandinga shift in emphasis in Dickens's growing apprehension of railway disaster. This shift in Dickens is very much in line with what railway historian Ralph Harrington has suggested about perceptions of railway disaster in the period. Whereas the railway was associated initially with the external destruction of landscape in its construction and of people in the wake of its accidents, it came later to provoke anxieties about internal disruption. Harrington also notes that the later part of the nineteenth century saw a change in the way people viewed accidents. Rather than private (individualized) happenings they became public ones, affecting or concerning the whole of society (1-2). 15 The paradox of railway shock, then, for the Victorians, was that what seemed insignificant and hidden-delayed nervous shock without physical injury-was nevertheless public in its significance. This paradox is articulated in "The Signalman," where, although the emphasis is on the internal disruption and fragmentation of trauma, there is undeniably a public dimension to the experience, both the signalman's sense of being at once responsible yet powerless, and in the communication or transmission of the trauma to the narrator.
As the editor of widely read journals, and in his novels and stories, Dickens espoused many public causes, championing the indi-vidual plight and exposing the public responsibility for what may have appeared to be merely personal or private hardship. Dickens, it is fair to say, is preeminently the Victorian writer who claims the public dimension of private trauma. No stranger to traumatic experience before the railway accident, as his continual, fictive reenactments of abandonment and childhood abuse attest, Dickens was perhaps brought through the Staplehurst accident to a sharper intimation of the nature of trauma than ever before. He lost his voice in that accident to find it later, as I have argued, in articulating in this story of ghostly clairvoyance and hindsight the characteristics of trauma barely broached in the discourse of nervous shock during the 1860s. Taylor notes that theories like Wigan's fed into the fin de siecle's fascination with split selves such as Jekyll and Hyde ("Obscure Recesses" 149).
University of Toronto

11
The story has attracted a wide variety of interpretations. See Day; Greenman;
Mengel "Structure and Meaning"; Seed; Stahl; Tytler. 
